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Abstract
The distinguishing feature of a metasystem is middle-
ware that facilitates viewing a collection of large, dis-
tributed, heterogeneous resources as a single virtual ma-
chine, where each user of the metasystem is identiﬁed by a
unique metasystem-level identity. The physical resources
of the metasystem can exist in multiple administrative
domains, each with different local security requirements
and authentication mechanisms (e.g., Kerberos, public-
key). The problem this paper addresses is how to map
the metasystems-level identity to an appropriate account
on each local physical machine for the purposes of pro-
cess creation, such that the access control and authen-
tication policies of each local machine are not violated.
This mapping must ensure the integrity of the local ma-
chines, must ensure the integrity of the metasystem user’s
data, and must not unnecessarily burden either the meta-
system users, the metasystem system administrator, or the
local machine system administrators. Speciﬁc examples
are drawn from experiences gained during the deployment
of the Legion metasystem. For example, Legion conﬁgu-
rations for local sites with different access control mech-
anisms such as standard UNIX mechanisms and Kerberos
are compared. Through analysis of these conﬁgurations,
the inherent security trade-offs in each design are derived.
These results have practical importance to current and fu-
ture metasystem users and to sites considering any future
inclusion of local resources in a global virtual computer.
￿
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1 Introduction
The emerging widespread introduction and use of giga-
bit wide area and local area networks have the potential to
transform the way people compute, and more importantly
thewaytheyinteractandcollaboratewithoneanother. The
increase in bandwidth will enable the construction of wide
areavirtualcomputerscalledmetasystemsormetacomput-
ers (see Figure 1). The challenge in the construction of the
metasystem layer is to provide the illusion of a single vir-
tual machine from resources that may consist of thousands
of heterogeneous processors, storage systems, databases,
legacy codes, and user objects, all distributed over wide-
area networks spanning multiple administrative domains.
The physical machines that a site chooses to participate in
a metasystem are generally still available for use by the
site’s local users, so it is important that the metasystem’s
impact on local users be minimal.
A key challenge of the metasystem is to provide a se-
cure environment for both resource owners and users. Se-
curity services provided by the metacomputer software in-
frastructure are not unlike traditional services required in
uniprocessor operating systems. Users must authenticate
themselves to the “system”. Users must not be allowed to
access arbitrary resources. Logging mechanisms must be
used to hold users accountable and to track intruders.
However, a solution to the metacomputer security prob-
lem requiressigniﬁcant additionsoverthe uniprocessorse-
curity solution [5], particularly because the machines that
comprise the metacomputer may not be administered by
a single policy-making entity. A single metasystem can
span multiple organizations,but only if each individual or-
ganization’srequirements with respect to resources owned
by that organization are satisﬁed. The metasystem must
be made to accommodate local policy, over which the
metasystem designers have little or no inﬂuence. That is,
metasystem developers cannot mandate underlying secu-
rity policy or mechanism; the challenge is to adhere to andMetasystem 
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Figure 1. General Metasystem Architecture
support local security policies while creating an easy-to-
use and secure environment for end users.
Thus, in a metacomputing environment, the security
problem can be divided into two main concerns:
1. Protecting the metacomputer’s high-level resources,
services, and users from each other and from possi-
bly corrupted underlying resources (within the meta-
system layer in Figure 1)
2. Preserving the security policies of the underlying re-
sources that form the foundationof the metacomputer
and minimizingtheir vulnerabilityto attacks from the
metacomputer level (the vertical arrows in Figure 1)
For example, restricting who is able to conﬁgure a
metacomputer-wide scheduling service would fall in the
ﬁrstcategory—itssolutionrequiresmetacomputer-speciﬁc
deﬁnitions of identity, authorization, and access control.
Meanwhile, enforcing a policy that permits only those
metacomputer users who have local accounts to run jobs
on a given host falls in the second category, and it might
require a means to map between metacomputer identities
and local identities. Satisfying this second concern is vi-
tally important, because the typical physical machine that
in part comprises the metacomputer appears identical to
other local machines to the local users (its participation
in the metacomputer should be completely hidden to non-
metacomputer users).
In a metasystem, arbitrary users must not be allowed to
allocate resources on arbitrary machines. In contrast, al-
lowingthisisanalogoustoalocalsysadmingrantinganac-
count to any person without an evaluation of what the per-
son might do on the machine if an account were granted!
Sysadminsrarely allow thisin order to protectthe integrity
of the data on their machines and to ensure that resources
will be available to legitimate users. Similarly, local sites
will choose to participate in a metasystem, but contingent
on assurances that their local security policies will not be
violated.
The speciﬁc requirement of a metasystem that this pa-
per addresses is that the metasystem must only create pro-
cesses for users that have been authenticated and are au-
thorized to use the particular underlying resources. For
example, a site’s security requirements could range from
notrestrictive(allowinganymetasystemusertocreatepro-
cesses, even if the particular metasystem user does not
have an account on the computers at the site) to very
restrictive (allowing only those users who have personal
accounts on the machines on their site, and only after
Kerberos authentication). Note that in all cases, only
users who have authenticated themselves to the metasys-
tem layer are allowed to create processes. A challenge in
the metasystem is to efﬁciently select those resources that
supportoneormoreoftheuser’sauthenticationcertiﬁcates
or credentials, and then securely present the appropriate
certiﬁcates or credentials with minimal (if any) direct in-
teraction with the user.
To create a process on one of the physical machines that
comprise the metasystem, the unique metasystem iden-
tity must be mapped to an appropriate account on the se-
lected physical machine. This mapping must be speciﬁc to
the authentication requirements of the local machine, must
onlybeperformedforthosephysicalmachinesuponwhich
the metasystem user is allowed to create processes (a lo-
cal system may only be accessible by a subset of all users
of the metasystem), and must be securely conﬁgured and
performed (a non-privileged user is not allowed to specify
this mapping). In addition, it is our belief that the success
of a metasystem greatly depends on its ease of use by end-
users,sotheimpactonthemetasystemusermustbekepttoa minimum.
￿ However,theremustbea balancebetweenthe
user’s desire to only have to be interactively authenticated
once for the entire metasystem versus a system adminis-
trator requiring a particular form of strong authentication
that is unique to her site. In other words, the user does
not want to have to manage potentially dozens of SecurID
cards, smart cards, and passwords, while the system ad-
ministrator of a government supercomputer certainly will
not accept a one-size-ﬁts-all approach for authentication
in the metasystem that places the authentication require-
ments of a university computer on the same level as her
more strategic resources.
The contribution of this paper is that it reveals how this
metacomputing problem manifests itself and is solved in
the context of Legion, which is a object-based metasys-
tem project discussed in Section 2. It presents the Legion
solution to three site-speciﬁc requirements to authentica-
tion and authorizationfor the purposes of process creation.
In the ﬁrst scenario, the site requires standard UNIX ac-
cess control (similar to most UNIX installations at univer-
sities). Inthenexttwo scenarios,the sitesrequireKerberos
authentication but differ in their speciﬁc security policies
regarding process creation after Kerberos authentication.
The mechanism by which to map Legion identity to local
account is discussed for each scenario. The “level of se-
curity” as compared to ease of use of each scenario is dis-
cussed in terms of the likelihood and ramiﬁcations of the
compromise of user credentials. The importance of this
work is that it describes the solution to real-world security
problems that exist as a result of users who increasingly
create programs that require transparent, secure access to
multiple, distributed, heterogeneous resources. Sites are
eager to deploy the Legion metasystem software, but only
after receiving assurances that their local security policies
are satisﬁed. Without solutions such as these described in
this paper, Legion cannot be deployed on a large-scale ba-
sis.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2
presents the Legion mechanisms for security that are in-
dependent of any underlying host system. This section
coversidentity, authentication, authorization,and account-
ability. Section 3 describes how processes are started and
controlled, and how ﬁles are written, on a system that em-
ploys standard UNIX access control. Section 4 describes
two conﬁgurations in which Legion integrates with a Ker-
berized host. Section 5 describes projects that are related
to this work. Section 6 contains the conclusions.
2 Security provided by Legion mechanisms
Legion [7, 8] is an object-based metasystem with a goal
of supporting millions of objects spread across thousands
of machines. Legion executes as middleware—below the
end-userapplicationsbutabovetheoperatingsystem(thus,
the Legion infrastructure itself is not privileged code). Le-
gion provides process management, inter-process commu-
nication, persistent storage, a single uniﬁed ﬁle system,
and security services. Legion supports PVM, MPI, C, For-
tran,a parallelC++,JavaandtheCORBA IDL.Legioncan
select resources for use by applications and securely co-
ordinate large-scale application execution, eliminating the
need for the end-user to explicitly log on to each machine,
FTP ﬁles, create processes, create temporary ﬁles, etc. A
project of Legion’s size and scope is faced with numer-
oustechnicalchallenges,all relatedtomanagingthepoten-
tially huge number of underlying heterogeneous hardware
and software platforms.
In the Legion system, host objects represent processing
resources. WhenaLegionobjectisinstantiated,itisaHost
Object that actually creates a process to contain the newly
activated object. The Host Object thus controls access to
its processing resource and can enforce local policies, e.g.,
ensuring that a user does not consume more processing
time than allotted. Vault objects in Legion represent stable
storage available within the system for containing Object
Persistent Representations (OPRs). Just as Host Objects
are the managers of active Legion objects, Vault Objects
are the managers of inert Legion objects. For example,
Vaults are the point of access control to storage resources,
and can enforce policies such as ﬁle system allocations.
The security model for Legion differs signiﬁcantly from
that of conventional systems. A Legion “system” is re-
ally a federation of resources from multiple administrative
domains, each with its own separately evaluated and en-
forced security policies. As such, there is no central kernel
or trusted code base that can monitor and control all in-
teractions between users and resources. Nor is there the
concept of a superuser—no one person or entity controls
all of the resources in a Legion system.
While there is no single superuser, in practice there are
a few privileged users who control access to the core re-
sources such as vaults and hosts. These privileged users
establish trust relationships between themselves, and use
these trust relationships upon which to control access to
their respective resources. For example, assume that there
are two sets of resources, controlled by two separate privi-
legedusers, andthatthereareestablished,non-overlapping
sets of users of these resources. One of these privileged
users may agree to let the other’s set of users have access
to her resources, as long as a reciprocal relationship is also
established. It is a subject of future research to determine
to what degree this privilege can be dispersed amongst a
largergroup ofprivilegedusers (with decreasingprivilege)
and still remain an operational metasystem.
The purpose of this section is to provide a discussionof Legion security mechanisms that is independent of the
underlying security mechanisms and policies of the host
systems. Thematerial inthissection ispresentedprimarily
to establish the context for the remaining sections. For
more details regarding these mechanisms, see [5].
2.1 Identity
Identity is fundamental to higher-level security services
suchasaccesscontrol. EveryLegionobjectisidentiﬁedby
a unique, multi-ﬁeld, location-independent Legion Object
Identiﬁer, or LOID. One of the LOID ﬁelds contains se-
curity information such as an X.509 certiﬁcate [3] or more
simplyjustanRSA publickey. TheX.509certiﬁcatein the
LOID is not an X9.57 attribute certiﬁcate [16], but rather
an ID certiﬁcate (also referred to as a public-key certiﬁ-
cate [4]), and pairs a public key with a person’s name, or-
ganization, identiﬁcation of the public key algorithm, and
other information. A certiﬁcate may be signed by a certi-
ﬁcation authority (CA) that vouches for the association of
the key with the identifying information. To coverthe case
where a recipient doesn’t recognize the CA, the CA’s own
certiﬁcate can be chained onto the certiﬁcate, allowing the
CA’s CA to be the basis of authority. The user’s X.509
ID certiﬁcate is propagated with requests and method calls
made directly or indirectly on behalf of the user. The in-
formation in the certiﬁcate is used when making entries to
access logs. While it is sufﬁcient to use only the LOID,
at times it is easier to simply include this information di-
rectly in the logs, without requiring a mapping from LOID
to user identiﬁcation such as name, organization, etc.
In a distributed object system such as Legion, the user
typically accesses resources indirectly, and objects need
to be able to perform actions on his behalf. One way in
which to allow intermediate objects to request services on
behalf of an originating object is to give the intermediate
objects a copy of the private key of the originating object,
thus providing necessary authentication information. This
approach is clearly insecure, as intermediate objects could
then maliciouslyoriginate operations on falsebehalf of the
originating object. An alternative approach is to have in-
termediateobjects call back to the user or his trusted proxy
when they receive access requests in the user’s name. This
step puts control back in the user’s hands. There are sev-
eral drawbacks to this approach, though. First, the ﬁne-
grain control afforded by authorization callbacks may be
mostly illusory. It can be very difﬁcult to craft policies
for a user proxy (or even the real user himself!) that are
muchmorethan“grantallrequests”—toomuchcontextual
and semantic informationis generally missing from the re-
quest. Beyond this barrier, callbacks are expensive and do
not scale well. In Legion, after all, every object represents
a resource of some type, and a callback on every method
call would be a crippling performance hit.
The intermediate solution between these approaches is
to issue credentials (also known as X509v3 certiﬁcates
with explicit authorizations or X9.57 attribute certiﬁcates)
toobjects. A credentialisa listofrightsgrantedby thecre-
dential’s maker, presumably the user. They can be passed
through call chains. When an object requests a resource, it
presents the credential to gain access. The resource checks
the rights in the credential and who the maker is, and uses
that information in deciding to grant access. There are two
main types of credentials in Legion: delegated credentials
and bearer credentials. A delegated credential speciﬁes
exactly who is granted the listed rights, whereas simple
possession of a bearer credential grants the rights listed
within it. A Legion credential speciﬁes the period the cre-
dential is valid, who is allowed to use the credential, and
the rights—which methods may be called on which spe-
ciﬁc objects or class of objects. The credential also in-
cludes the identity of its maker, who digitally signs the
complete credential.
2.2 Access control
Each Legion object is responsible for enforcing its own
accesscontrolpolicy. Thegeneralmodelforaccesscontrol
is that access is only available through method calls, and
that each method call received at an object passes through
a MayI layer before being serviced (see Figure 2). MayI
decideswhetherto grant accessaccordingto whateverpol-
icy it implements. If access is denied, the object will re-
spond with an appropriate security exception, which the
caller can handle any way it sees ﬁt.
MayI can be implemented in multiple ways. The triv-
ial MayI layer just allows all access. Most objects, how-
ever, use the Legion-provided default MayI implementa-
tion, which essentially deﬁnes, on a per-method basis, an
allow list and a deny list. If a LOID is on both lists, access
is denied. The entries in the lists are the LOIDs of callers
that are granted or denied the right to call the particular
method. Default allow and deny lists can be speciﬁed to
cover methods that don’t have their own entries.
By default, an object is created with an ACL that is a
function of the class of the object and gives read access
to the world and write access to the owner. For example,
all methods that involve “reading” are allowed to be ex-
ecuted by users that have authenticated to the particular
Legion system. The owner of the object is free to dynami-
cally modify any allow list or any deny list for any method
– including the method that is executed to modify these
lists! Usually, these lists are modiﬁed through the use of
a GUI. Currently, the use of a standardized access control
language such as GAA [13] is being investigated.
When a method call is received, the credentials it car-A MayI? foo()
B.foo()
No!
Ok
B
Figure 2. Legion Implementation of Access Control
ries are checked by MayI and compared against the access
control lists. For example, in the case of a delegated cre-
dential, the caller must have included proof of his identity
in the call so that MayI can conﬁrm that the credential ap-
plies. Multiple credentials can be carried in a call; check-
ing continues until one provides access.
2.3 Communication between Legion objects
A method call from one Legion object to another can
consist of multiple Legion messages. BecauseLegion sup-
ports dataﬂow-based method invocation, the various argu-
ments of a method call may ﬂow into the target as mes-
sages from several different objects. A message from one
Legion object to another Legion object may be sent with
no security, in private mode, or in protected mode. In
both private and protected modes, certain key elements of
a message (e.g., any contained credentials) are encrypted
with the public key of the recipient Legion object. In pri-
vate mode the body of the message is encrypted, whereas
in protected mode only a Message Authentication Code
(MAC) is generated to provide an integrity guarantee. To
enable faster computations, protected mode is the default,
although the user can easily change this. Unless private
mode is already on, protected mode is selected automati-
cally if a message contains credentials. The mode selected
for use by an originating object is applied for all messages
indirectly generated as a result of the originating message.
For example, a user can select private mode when calling
an object. The calls that the object makes on behalf of
the user will also use private mode, and so on down the
line. Currently, encryption is based on the RSA toolkit
(RSAREF 2.0).
In addition to protecting credentials, both protected
mode and private mode encrypt a computation tag con-
tained in every Legion message, a random number token
that is generated for each method call. All the messages
that make up a given method call contain the same compu-
tation tag. The tag is used to assemble incoming messages
frommultipleobjectsintoa singlemethodcallandto iden-
tify the return value for a call made earlier. If an attacker
knows the computation tag for a method call, he can forge
complete messages containing arguments or return values,
evenwithoutholdinganycredentials. Thecomputationtag
is treated as a shared secret, and is never transmitted in the
clear unless “no security” mode is selected.
The security layer does not provide mutual authentica-
tion. The sender can be assured of the identity of the re-
cipient, because only the desired recipient can read the en-
cryptedparts ofthe message. Therecipientusuallydoesn’t
care who the actual senderis; its decisions are based solely
on the credentials and the X.509 ID certiﬁcate(s) that ar-
rived in the message.
3 Legion integration with standard UNIX
access control
The previous section described object interactions at the
logical level of the metasystem in Figure 1—speciﬁcally,
how one Legion object can authenticate with another Le-
gion object and exchange secure communication. How-
ever, Legion objects must physically exist on a host that
is part of the metasystem. This section describes how the
metasystem identity is mapped to a physical account and
an object is instantiated on a host that requires only stan-
dard UNIX access control.
Our general strategy for isolating Legion objects from
one another is to run them in separate accounts on the host
system. The accounts that can be used for this purpose fall
into two categories:
￿ For those Legion users who happen to have accounts
on the system, objects can run on their normal user
accounts.
￿ For other users, there is a pool of generic accounts
that are assigned for Legion use.
The generic accounts usually have minimal permissions.
ThelocalHostObjectandVaultObjectalsohavetheirown
accounts.
The use of generic accountsis appropriatefor those sites
that require that one user be isolated from another on the
underlying host machine (e.g., different UNIX accounts)but
￿ do not require strict, persistent mapping from metasys-
tem ID to local account. In these situations, accountability
is through logging Legion user X.509 ID certiﬁcates. The
more “tightly controlled” metasystems will probably not
make use of generic accounts, if only because policy of-
ten mandates that no person can make use of a resource
without ﬁrst ﬁling the appropriate account applications.
Object creationrequests arriveat the Host Object as nor-
mal method invocations, and can thus be controlled using
the standard Legion access control mechanism for meth-
ods. For each request, the host checks the credentials
against the user LOIDs and groups that are allowed to cre-
ate objects on it. If everything is acceptable, it next selects
an account for the new object to run in; depending on the
credentials in the creation request and its local conﬁgu-
ration, it may choose a local user account or one of the
generic accounts. The accounts are subject to scheduling
and resource control just like CPU time, memory usage,
and so on; an object’s lease on an account, especially a
generic account, is usually limited.
All Legion objects are associated with some persistent
storage, typically in the form of a directory in the local ﬁle
system managed by the Object Vault. Before starting an
actual process for the new object in the allocated account,
the host needs to change the ownership of the object’s di-
rectory from the vault user-id to the newly allocated user-
id. The location of the directory that will contain the new
object’s persistent state is passed to the host as part of the
activation request (this location was obtained through a
method on the local vault performed by the object’s cre-
ator, likely its class). Ownership of this directory must be
changed both to protect the object’s state from access by
other objects (which will run under differentuser-ids), and
to make the state accessible to the new object.
Finally, the host needs to spawn the actual process that
will execute the object on the appropriate account. To
carry out this step, and to change ownership of the object’s
persistent state, the host requires access to some privileged
operations. However, the host does not execute with root
permissions. Access to these required privileged opera-
tions is encapsulated in a process control daemon (PCD)
that executes on the host, providing services to the Host
Object in a controlled fashion. The PCD is a small, easily
vetted program that runs with root permissions. It is con-
ﬁgured only to allow access by the host account. Two of
its key functions are to permit changing directory owner-
ship and to create new processes on a designated account.
The PCD limits the accounts for which this can be done to
a set conﬁgured by the local system administrator. The set
includes the generic Legion accounts and potentially the
accounts of local Legion users.
A simpliﬁed example of this operation is shown in Fig-
ure 3. In this example, Object 12, which is executing on
Fred’s account on some machine in the metasystem, and
has access to Fred’s Legion credentials, wants to create an
objectonthehostElmer.virginia.edu. Todothis, Object12
asks the Host Object executing on Elmer to start a process
forthe newobject. First,theHostObjectconﬁrmsthatOb-
ject 12 is acting on Fred’s behalf by looking at the creden-
tials contained in the request. Then, the Host Object maps
a request by Fred to a generic account (Legion-generic-1)
on Elmer.virginia.edu that has been established at the time
that Legion was installed on Elmer.virginia.edu. Finally,
the Host Object asks the PCD to spawn a new process as
Legion-generic-1 for the new object.
AsthePCDstartstheobjectrunning,thehostlogsanau-
dit trail using the X.509 ID certiﬁcate for the user whose
credentials accompanied the request. The audit trail pro-
vides essential information if the new object misuses local
resources. If the object has exceeded its use of local re-
sources, the host can request that the PCD kill it directly.
When an object loses or relinquishes its use of an account,
the Host Object uses the PCD to change the ownership of
its persistent state back to the Vault Object. If the object
is reactivated later on a differentaccount, ownershipof the
state can be changed to the appropriate local user-id. After
an account is reclaimed, the PCD terminates all processes
running on it and generally cleans it up.
Security Analysis. In accepting this approach, a sysad-
min at a local site is trusting the Legion software to le-
gitimately map Legion identities to local accounts (if the
PCD is conﬁgured to map to non-generic local accounts).
If the Legion credentials for a particular user are stolen,
the risk to the system is less when conﬁgured for generic
accounts than with non-generic accounts (by their nature,
when a user is ﬁnished with a generic account, no persis-
tent state remains). A negative aspect of this approach is
that a site must install the PCD as privileged code, cre-
ating a potential point of attack for intruders. However,
this code has been vetted by numerous experts, increas-
ing the conﬁdence on the part of local site regarding the
safety of this code. Of course, if the Legion Host Object
account (“Legion-Account”in Figure 3) is cracked, the in-
truder can create processes under the accounts of any local
Legion users.
Overall. The PCD-based implementation is sufﬁcient
for many local system administrators. Legion authenti-
cation is used to determine who gains access to local re-
sources, and the resources made available are also con-
strained to those usable from a limited set of accounts.
Detailed logging provides accountability. The safety of
credentials is a chief design goal in the security architec-5
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Figure 3. Object Creation on a Standard UNIX Access Control Host
ture and mechanisms of Legion. An alternative, simple
approach is to have all Legion objects execute under the
“Legion-Account” account. In general, we have found
that sysadmins do not like this approach because of lim-
ited accountability—as far as they see, only one account
“doesanything”with regardto Legion. We (theLegionde-
signers) do not advocate this approach, because it does not
provide the necessary isolation, as all ﬁles and processes
are owned by one oner id (meaning that one Legion user
can use UNIX mechanisms to destroy or subvert another
Legion user on the same host).
4 Legion integration with a Kerberized host
Increased security concerns have caused many sites to
switch from standard UNIX access control to the use of
Kerberos [11]. Kerberos is a trusted third-party authenti-
cation, in which users and services register their keys. In
this paper, familiarity with the basic Kerberos protocols
are assumed. Legion has been integrated with a Kerber-
ized host, and is discussed in this paper, because certain
sites have wanted to run Legion and mandated the use of
Kerberos.
It is important to understand that the “Kerberized Host”
in this section refers to a host that is executing the MIT
source code distribution [9]. This paper does not discuss
efforts to integrate Kerberos directly with public key cryp-
tography [14], because this paper focuses on integration
withwidely-deployedKerberossystems. Similarly,theuse
of Proxiable tickets in Kerberos is not discussed, because
their usage is not widely supported. While its support is
not directly discussed, much of the discussion is applica-
ble to AFS.
In this section, assume that a simple Legion metacom-
puter is being constructed. There are only two machines
involved: Khost, which is the Kerberized Host machine,
and NKhost, which is a machinethat doesnot require Ker-
beros authentication (instead, it uses only password-based
authentication). Additionally, it is useful to deﬁne the fol-
lowing entities:
L-creds credentials that are necessary to function in the
Legion virtual computer; these credentials reﬂect a
metasystem user’s identity
K-creds Kerberos credentials; obtained via Kerberos
kinit either explicitly or implicitly
L-admin a particular metasystem user with some admin-
istrative duties for the metasystem; Note that the
“L-admin” identity means nothing directly on either
Khost or NKhost (it must be mapped onto an ac-
count on each machine); by deﬁnition, L-admin has
L-creds; in order to authenticate to the metasystem
layer, the L-admin user must have ﬁrst authenticated
to the underlying physical machine: if L-admin ﬁrst
logged into Khost, then the user associated with L-
admin has K-creds as well.
Legion-Khost an account on Khost that is used solely
for executing processes related to the metasystem;
“Legion-Khost” is not an identity recognized at the
metasystem level (“Legion-Khost” has K-creds asso-
ciated with it but does not automatically have L-creds
associated with it)
Alice-KL a person who has an account on Khost and
wishes to participate in Legion virtual machine ex-
ecuting on Khost; has K-creds; has L-creds; has an
account on NKhostBob-L
￿ a person who has an “account” on the Legion
virtual machine but no account on Khost; has L-
creds; does not have K-creds; has a UNIX account
on NKhost
4.1 Kerberosbackground: .k5loginand.k5users
InKerberos,thereisthe capabilitytoallowoneprincipal
to grant access to another principal (after the other princi-
pal has authenticated). The ﬁle .k5login allows one user
to unconditionally grant another user the ability to spawn
processes as the ﬁrst user. For example, if
￿
Bob/.k5login
contained ”Jim”, user Jim could “ksu Bob” and have a
running shell whereas new processes are tagged as being
owned by Bob. Note that in this case, Jim does not ac-
quire Bob’s credentials; rather, in this case, Jim, executing
as UID Bob, has a copy of the Kerberos credentials Jim
had immediately prior to executing ksu. .k5users is more
restrictive than .k5login; .k5users lets Bob allow Jim to
executeonly certain binariesas Bob, for instance “/bin/ls”.
The entry in
￿
Bob/.k5users in this case is “Jim /bin/ls”. In
this case, Jim cannot execute a shell as Bob; Jim could
only “ksu Bob -e /bin/ls”.
4.2 Kerberos solution #1: k5login
A simple solution to allow a user such as Alice-KL with
an account on Khost to access the metasystem is to add
“Legion-Khost” to her .k5login ﬁle. This approach allows
Legion-Khost to execute “binary1” as Alice-KL by invok-
ing “ksu Alice-KL -e full-path-to-binary1”. For Alice-KL
to start a process on Khost, essentially the same steps as
in Figure 3 are taken. The difference in this situation is
that the PCD does not exist, as the Host Object can cre-
ate processes directly as Alice-KL via invocations of ksu.
In this conﬁguration, Legion mechanisms will ensure that
Bob-L will not be able to start new processes on Khost.
However, Bob-L will be able to use services (processes)
of Alice-KL, but only if Alice-KL has conﬁgured Legion
authorization mechanisms to let Bob-L.
Security Analysis. The analysis consists of a number of
cases:
If the Legion-Khost account is compromised (i.e., an
attacker obtains Legion-Khost Kerberos credential
cache, or breaks into the Host Object and, for
example, causes the Host Object to execute a binary
that allows the credential cache to be read), then
all Legion users on Khost, even if they have never
used Legion, have been compromised. The attacker
cannot get their K-creds, but can start processes on
their accounts1. There is a variation of this approach,
1The attacker can get their K-creds if the user is logged in.
beyond the scope of this paper, that uses .k5users
instead of .k5login in order to reduce the scope of
attackif the Legion-Khostiscompromised. However,
this approach is substantially more complicated to
implement and analyze.
If Alice-KL’s K-creds are stolen (i.e., either by some ac-
tivity irrespective of Legion, or if Alice-KL gives her
K-creds to a Legion “con-artist” object), then only
Alice-KL’s account is compromised. In this case, an
attacker can replace legitimate Alice-KL service with
corruptedservice,thustrickingBob-Lif Bob-Lwants
to use the service. However, the scope of this attack
may include several machines, as Kerberos creden-
tials are typically valid at a potentially large set of
machines.
If Alice-KL’s L-creds are stolen Alice-KL’s account is
compromised because the Host Object can be asked
to start jobs on her account.
If L-admin’s L-creds are stolen an attacker can effec-
tively shut down the Host Object but not break se-
curity. Note: admin has no special privileges with re-
gard to the Host Object, beyond being able to change
the ACLs on the Host Object.
Overall. The fact that Alice-KL can start a process on
the Khost without directly obtaining and presenting K-
creds is both positive and negative: The use of the Legion
virtual machine by Alice-KL is easier and perhaps more
secure because she does not need to directly acquire Ker-
beros credentials. A potential problem is that the Legion-
Khost has unlimited access to the Khost account of Alice-
KL. For this reason, Alice-KL and/or the sysadmins of
Khost might require that Alice-KL get a separate account
on Khost for use with the Legion virtual machine. For
many installations, this approach is sufﬁcient, satisfying
the requirement of Kerberos authentication before use of
the physical resources (the authentication in this case is by
the Legion-Khost principal). Security is provided by the
Legion mechanisms based on L-creds that have timeouts,
recovery mechanisms, and potentially very speciﬁc scope
and privilege. It is also very easy to implement.
4.3 Kerberos solution #2: KProxy object
In general, a problem of the k5login approach is that
a user must grant unlimited access to her account by the
Legion-Khost principal. A second problem is that a user
such as Alice-KL (or more precisely a person imperson-
ating Alice-KL) does not have to authenticate to the KDC
of the Khost Kerberos realm in order to use the physicalresources.
￿ A second approach eliminates these problems,
but at the cost of simplicity.
The essential component of the design is a Legion
KProxyObject for eachuser. This KProxyObject securely
holds the Legion user’s Kerberos credentials. The KProxy
Object for user Fred executes under Fred’s UID on a ma-
chine upon which Fred has an account. Whenever a Host
Object anywhere in the metasystem wants to create an ob-
ject on Fred’s behalf on its associated physical machine,
the Host Object performs a call back to the KProxy Ob-
ject for Fred to obtain a valid ticket for that particular host.
Fred’s KProxy Object will only issue Fred’s Kerberos cre-
dentials if Fred’s valid Legion credentials are presented
in the request (more generally, the access control mech-
anisms of Fred’s KProxy Object can be conﬁgured to is-
sue Fred’s Kerberos credentials to any object that presents
validcredentialson behalfof anyuserwith whom Fred has
previous established a trust relationship). The Host Object
creates the new object via a call to ksu, without requiring
the use of the .k5login ﬁle.
Note that all communication of secret information is
either done via Kerberos mechanisms (DES) or Legion
mechanisms(RSAREF).Cross-realmauthenticationisim-
mediatelyand transparently supportedin this design: kinit
only has to be performed once for each group of Kerberos
realms that support cross-realm authentication with each
other. The Legion KProxy object will automatically ob-
tain Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) for the other realms
based on the existence of a valid TGT for a given host.
The steps that Alice-KL must take in order to create
her KProxy object are shown in Figure 4. First, Alice-
KL obtain her K-creds from machine NKhost (this can
also be performed on Khost, although it doesn’t have to
be). By default, these K-creds are tied to the IP ad-
dress of NKhost. On NKhost, Alice-KL then executes le-
gion create kproxy,which asks the HostObject on Khost
to create an instance of KProxy class on Khost. As part of
this (not shown), Alice-KL interacts with the KDC to ob-
tain a ticket that is usable from Khost. These K-creds are
then used by the Host Object in an invocationof ksu to ac-
tually create the KProxy object that will hold Alice-KL’s
K-creds. This KProxy object will execute on this machine
under Alice-KL’s account. Note that neither Alice-KL’s
.k5login nor .k5users contains an entry that directly al-
lows Legion-Khost to execute this ksu; instead, ksu is in-
voked with an explicit copy of Alice-KL’s K-creds. Now,
anytime in the future that the Host Object on Khost wants
to create an object on Alice-KL’s behalf, it interacts with
this KProxy object to obtain a valid ticket for use in the
ksu invocation. Additionally,any Host Object in the realm
will interact with Alice-KL’s KProxy object when creating
objects.
Why can’t the Legion user obtain K-creds for a par-
ticular computation before starting the computation, thus
eliminating the need for the KProxy object? Legion is
an object-based system in which the necessary function-
ality to start and coordinate large-scale computation may
be spread across hundred or thousands of objects. When
a user originates computation, the user has no idea on
what machines processes ultimately will be started either
directly or indirectly on behalf of this user request. For ex-
ample, the user may attempt to “run discreet-simulation-1
1000 times”. At this point, the user has no idea (he may
not care) which machines are then selected by scheduler
objects. Thus, when the user originates computation, he
cannot obtain tickets (which are tied to IP addresses) for
all of the machineson whichprocesseswillbe started. Our
approach uses a call back to the KProxy object to get the
appropriate ticket for each machine.
A second, related note is that the user may not be
present (i.e, logged onto a machine in the Kerberos realm)
when the Legion software attempts to spawn processes on
his behalf. For example, assume that the user starts a
long-running activity on one machine, and then logs off.
The Legion software might then need to spawn a process
on another machine (if, for example, the computation is
pipelined, where each element of the pipeline is a sufﬁ-
ciently long computation). Again, we need a call back
to something (the KProxy object in our approach) in or-
der to obtain the necessary ticket. One approach might
be to somehow get a ticket from the process that already
exists that is performing the active part of the pipelined
computation (because the credentials cache is present for
this process, and presumably it contains a TGT). This is
essentially the approach of the KProxy object.
The key limitation that this approach overcomes is that
a process can only be started on Khost as user Alice-KL if
Alice-KL has previously authenticated herself to the KDC
of the Kerberos realm. In addition, at any point, Alice-KL
can control the creation of processes under her account by
eitherlimiting the lifetime ofthe ticket held by her KProxy
Object, or eliminate her KProxy object completely. How-
ever, it is still the case that the Legion user must trust the
Legionsoftware to createprocessesonly that she intended.
Security Analysis. The analysis consists of a number of
cases:
If the Legion-Khost account is compromised If Alice-
KL uses the subvertedKhost, the Host Object can use
her L-creds to obtain the K-creds from the KProxy.
The K-creds can then be misused by the Host Ob-
ject, for example, to spawn arbitrary processes under
Alice-KL’s user id (such as “rm *”). Note that un-
like the k5login approach, where a subverted Khost2b
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Figure 4. Object Creation on Kerberos-Controlled Host
Legion account can immediately abuse all local Le-
gion user accounts, this approach limits the attacker
to misusing the accounts of users currently starting
objects on the Khost. This allows intrusion detection
as an approach for limiting the damage caused by an
attacker.
If Alice-KL’s K-creds are stolen If the K-creds are
stolen in some activity irrespective of the metasys-
tem, the same ramiﬁcations exist as the k5login
approach. If Alice-KL’s K-creds are stolen by
attacking her KProxy object, the duration of the
compromise is limited by the direct or indirect scope
of the K-creds held by the KProxy object, which can
be controlled by Alice-KL.
If Alice-KL’s L-creds are stolen The same ramiﬁcations
as the k5login approach.
If admin’s L-creds are stolen The same ramiﬁcations as
the k5login approach.
Overall. This approach trades off some additional com-
plexity in terms of the systems structure and some extra
effort on the part of users (who periodically need to upload
refreshed Kerberos credentials to their respective KProxy
object) for an added measure of attack containment. This
approach meets the requirement that the user actively au-
thenticate through the Kerberos mechanism before using
the local resources (unlike Kerberos k5login approach).
This approach incurs added overhead due to the call-backs
to the KProxy object; however,these call-backsonly occur
at the time of object creation, so the impact should not be
signiﬁcant. Note that, as opposed to the krlogin approach,
the duration and scope of an attacker’s compromise is in
general limited by the K-creds being held by the KProxy
objects, which can be easily controlled.
5 Related work
There are several projects being conducted to support
inter-operability between a particular security infrastruc-
ture and Kerberos, for example supporting a single login
for NetWare and Kerberos [1]. This project has similar
goals to Legion’s integration with Kerberos—in particu-
lar, no changes to Kerberos and no reduction in security in
either security realm due to the single login. A signiﬁcant
differencebetween the Legion project and these projects is
that Legion attempts to build security mechanisms the can
be viewed as being on top of underlying security mech-
anisms of host systems, whereas these projects generally
attempt to support single sign-on of co-existing realms. In
a metasystem, it cannot be expected that every realm or
administrative domain directly acknowledge and support
each other’s existence.
MinskyandUngureanuaddresstheneedofunifyinghet-
erogeneous security policies in distributed systems by in-
troducing a formalism that describes various security poli-
cies[10]. A uniﬁedmechanismisusedto enforcethe secu-
rity schemes. This work is important for the construction
and analysis of security policies in metasystems, in that
the metasystem mechanism must support a wide variety of
local policies. However, in metasystems, the approach is
that the local sites can have whatever security policy they
want, and it is very likely that it will not be speciﬁed for-
mally. Requiring every local site to specify their security
policies in a single formalism is difﬁcult if not impossible,
severely impeding a metasystem’s deployment.
Yialelis and Sloman describe a security framework for
object-based distributed systems [17]. This project is re-
latedtotheworkinLegion,becauseitattemptstoallowthe
development of secure distributed applications on operat-
ing systems with varying degrees of security mechanisms
built in. While this work is similar to the Legion mech-
anisms described in Section 2, the work of Yialelis and
Sloman is CORBA-based and does not address the generalmetasystems
￿ requirements, such as hardware heterogene-
ity and multiple administrative domains.
Globus [6] is another metasystem research project, and
as such is addressing many of the same issues as Legion.
In many instances, convergent evolution has led to simi-
lar solutions to these problems. For example, Globus has
a small, easily-veriﬁed module called the Gatekeeper that
runs as root and is responsible for remote process manage-
ment, in much the same manner as the PCD. The manner
in which Globus integrates with Kerberos is through use of
the Generic Security Services API (GSS-API [15]). The
level of granularity of the GSS-API and the Legion ob-
ject model are fundamentally different: In GSS-API, two
applications such as FTP and FTPD establish a security
context and then communicate based on the security con-
text. In Legion, objects are signiﬁcantly more ﬁne-grained
than applicationssuch as FTP and FTPD—the overhead to
establish contexts establishing and deleting security con-
texts for each pair of communicating objects is intuitively
too expensive, as the number of object-object communica-
tions is potentially quite large in the life of a computation.
CRISIS [2] is the security architecture for the WebOS
project at UC Berkeley. The WebOS provides many of the
same high-level services as Legion. WebOS is fundamen-
tally different than Legion in that while WebOS focuses
on system-level support for building and running wide-
area applications, Legion’s goals are to provide an object-
based programming model suitable for such a wide-area
application. The principle goals of CRISIS are similar to
the goals of the security architecture in Legion: to use re-
dundancy to reduce the likelihood of system compromise,
cache whenever possible to improve performance, support
ﬁne-grained control over delegated rights, make extensive
use of logging, support local autonomy, and to make the
designas simple as possible. A differencebetweenthe two
systemsisa resultofLegion’ssupportforautonomywhich
is not a focus of WebOS: Legion supports dynamically-
conﬁgured local security mechanisms, and CRISIS sup-
ports uniform mechanism across all of the nodes of the
wide-area system (although policy within each node may
be separately deﬁned).
6 Conclusions
While a goal of a metasystem can be to provide an
abstraction of a single virtual machine from large, dis-
tributed, heterogeneous resources, ultimately a metasys-
temcomputationis comprisedofactivitieson physicalma-
chines at different sites with different goals. These activ-
ities include process creation, ﬁle creation and modiﬁca-
tion, “native” IPC mechanisms, “native” schedulers such
as Codine and LoadLeveler, etc. This paper described the
issues involved in supporting the notion of identity at the
level of the metasystem, speciﬁcally with regard to pro-
cess creation. It was shown how a metasystem identity can
be securely mapped to a physical account both for stan-
dard UNIX access control and for Kerberos-based access
control. In the future, other authentication systems will be
integrated with current Legion authentication support. A
particular system that is currently being developed is inte-
gration with SSL/TLS via OpenSSL [12].
On a practical level, these approaches are important be-
cause they are in active use at various local sites within de-
ployed Legion networks. Many times, a single concurrent
computation can consist of many processes spread across
hosts that require different authentication and access con-
trol. Therefore, the security implications of each are of
great interest to system administrators and users at such
sites. On a more general level, these designs demonstrate
the degree to which the Legion architecture can accommo-
date and adapt to site-local requirements.
The Legion system is currently widely deployed, in-
corporating diverse resources at Supercomputing Cen-
ters, Labs, and Universities. For more information
about the current status of the Legion system, see
http://legion.virginia.edu. The power of the environment
increases with the scale and scope of the system. We con-
tinue to actively integrate new sites into Legion. A nat-
ural part of the evolution requires us to adapt the Legion
security architecture to new site-local policies and mech-
anisms. The work presented here describes our current
dominant site conﬁgurations. In the future we expect to
see this set expand as Legion deployment increases.
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